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I.  INTRODUCTION: WHAT DO WE MEAN BY PRIVACY? 
The topic of privacy comes up very frequently today.  Apart from the ex-
tensive discussion in technology and academic circles, within the political arena 
this is apparently the closest thing to a bipartisan concern,1 and the popular 
press and business-oriented legal environment all treat the subject as a high 
priority.  COVID-19 and a fervent desire by all to use technology to reduce the 
likelihood of its recurrence are justifiably major factors in current discussions, 
but equally justifiable concerns about the impact of such technology on Amer-
icans’ privacy also demand a good deal of attention on privacy law as it stands 
and as some may seek to change it.  For example, as this article was being 
finalized, the Wall Street Journal reported that in an effort to expedite employ-
ees return to work following virus-related lockdowns, “United Health and Mi-
crosoft Corp. jointly developed an app that checks worker symptoms and gives 
a go-ahead to report to work.”2 
 
1. For example, when commenting on pending legislation, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley stated: 
“I hope once more that the perfect won’t be the enemy of the good. . . . I hope that in the next year — 
still in this Congress — that [the] Commerce [Committee] and others will say, ‘You know what? We 
can get some things done.’” Jessica Smith, Will 2020 be the year of a federal privacy law?, YAHOO 
FIN., (Dec. 23, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/will-2020-be-the-year-of-a-federal-data-pri-
vacy-law-185226703.html.  Of course, this was the view prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. 
2. Sarah Krouse, Bosses Begin Testing Workers for COVID-19, WALL ST. J., (May 25, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-tests-come-to-work-11590399001?mod=hp_lead_pos3.  In 
the same article, a human resources executive stated that ‘health questions once deemed too intrusive 
are now necessary for workplace safety.’  This may be medically correct but ignores the fact that 
applicable privacy laws did not change during the pandemic.  Several bills are pending in Congress to 
regulate the use of such apps.  For example, Sens. Cantwell, Klobuchar, and Cassidy introduced the 
Exposure Notification Act. See note 165 and accompanying discussion. 
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Yet, there is a good deal of disagreement as to what ‘privacy’ actually en-
tails and why it should be prioritized.  This article intends to explain the differ-
ent objectives and authorities incorporated into this area of law and provide the 
authors’ own views, as experienced practitioners advising technologically-ori-
ented businesses, of what social utility is being provided, and at what opera-
tional cost, and what should be adjusted. 
A brief background to the privacy landscape in the United States starts with 
an illustrative juxtaposition of the US and European approaches to personal 
information.  While the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)3 is a general, comprehensive law that addresses personal information 
regardless of whether it is collected by a bank or a hospital, the US has, at the 
federal level, followed a ‘sectoral’ approach with laws that address in somewhat 
tangential fashion security and use of particular categories of data such as, but 
not limited to, health information4 and financial information.5  The US has no 
comprehensive federal codification of authority and, at least at this writing,6 no 
generally applicable federal statute that would cover personal information not 
captured or preempted by existing federal legislation. 
While there are a number of definitions that exist, all of privacy law deals 
with ‘personal information.’  Until the passage of recent laws, including the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (or ‘CCPA’),7 the ‘standard’ definition of 
‘personal information’ among the states was some variety of an individual’s 
first name or first initial and last name plus one or more of the following data 
elements: (i) Social Security number, (ii) driver’s license number or state-is-
sued ID card number, (iii) bank account number, credit card number, or debit 
card number combined with any security code, access code, PIN, or password 
needed to access an account and generally applies to computerized data that 
includes personal information.  Such definitions have tended to be bundled with 
data breach notification provisions, with the result being that the definition of 
 
3. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 
2016 L 119/1 [hereinafter GDPR].   
4. For example, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (‘HIPAA’), 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg; 29 U.S.C § 1181 et seq.; Pub. L. No. 104-191, 42 U.S.C § 1320d et seq.; Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (‘HITECH Act’), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 200 et seq. 
5. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 12 U.S.C. § 1811. 
6. While prospects for enactment are questionable, both Senate Republicans and Democrats 
have introduced separate bills loosely modeled after the GDPR. Deven McGraw, Pending Federal 
Privacy Legislation: A Status Update, MEDIUM, (July 24, 2019), https://medium.com/@ciitizen/the-
healthcareblog-series-the-health-data-goldilocks-dilemma-privacy-sharing-both-ce4689d3fc1f. 
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020) et seq. 
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personal information flowed from a concern about identity theft and financial 
harm. 
With the passage of the CCPA, the US privacy landscape has undergone a 
sea change.  The CCPA’s definition of ‘personal information’8 is not linked to 
those elements that, if compromised, can cause tangible harm to the individual; 
instead, the CCPA’s definition drills down to capture what was previously 
thought of as non-identifying data, such as device ID and IP address, and ‘drills 
up’ to capture an amorphous and highly changeable concept of ‘household.’  
The CCPA provides that: 
‘Personal information’ means information that identifies, relates to, de-
scribes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.9  
Personal information includes, but is not limited to, the following if it 
identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or 
could be reasonably linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular con-
sumer or household: 
(A) Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique per-
sonal identifier, online identifier, Internet Protocol address, email 
address, account name, social security number, driver’s license 
number, passport number, or other similar identifiers. 
(B) Any categories of personal information described in subdivi-
sion (e) of Section 1798.80.10 
(C) Characteristics of protected classifications under California or 
federal law. 
 
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020). 
9. While the statute does not define this term, the text of the final regulations defines “house-
hold” as “a person or group of people who: (1) reside at the same address, (2) share a common device 
or the same service provided by a business, and (3) are identified by the business as sharing the same 
group account or unique identifier.”  
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999 et seq., https://www.oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-
sub-final-text-of-regs.pdf. 
10. In this section of California’s Customer Records Act, “personal information” means any 
information that identifies, relates to, describes, or is capable of being associated with, a particular 
individual, including, but not limited to, his or her name, signature, social security number, physical 
characteristics or description, address, telephone number, passport number, driver’s license or state 
identification card number, insurance policy number, education, employment, employment history, 
bank account number, credit card number, debit card number, or any other financial information, med-
ical information, or health insurance information.  “Personal information” does not include publicly 
available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local 
government records. 
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(D) Commercial information, including records of personal prop-
erty, products or services purchased, obtained, or considered, or 
other purchasing or consuming histories or tendencies. 
(E) Biometric information.11 
(F) Internet or other electronic network activity information, in-
cluding, but not limited to, browsing history, search history, and 
information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an Internet 
Web site, application, or advertisement. 
(G) Geolocation data. 
(H) Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar infor-
mation. 
(I) Professional or employment-related information. 
(J) Education information, defined as information that is not pub-
licly available personally identifiable information as defined in the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. § 1232g, 34 
C.F.R. Part 99). 
(K) Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this 
subdivision to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the con-
sumer’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, predis-
positions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.12 
To be clear, this article intends to cover only US privacy law, of which there 
is a great deal to discuss among state laws,13 state and federal administrative 
pronouncements,14 and limited federal statutory law.15  However, as earlier sug-
gested, the subject cannot be properly addressed without some understanding 
of the origins and influence of the GDPR, which is of great importance both of 
itself and as a template for US legislation and its interpretation.16 
 
11. “Biometric information” means an individual’s physiological, biological or behavioral 
characteristics, including an individual’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), that can be used, singly or in 
combination with each other or with other identifying data, to establish individual identity.  Biometric 
information includes, but is not limited to, imagery of the iris, retina, fingerprint, face, hand, palm, 
vein patterns, and voice recordings, from which an identifier template, such as a faceprint, a minutiae 
template, or a voiceprint, can be extracted, and keystroke patterns or rhythms, gait patterns or rhythms, 
and sleep, health, or exercise data that contain identifying information.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(b) 
(West 2020).  The breadth of the definition goes beyond the layman’s idea of ‘biometric’ data to reach 
changeable characteristics and information captured in a pinpoint of time. 
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1). 
13. See, e.g., infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 64, 74-84 and accompanying text for discussion of guidance from Federal 
Trade Commission and California Attorney General. 
15. And largely non-existent case law. 
16. As this article went to press, California voters took action which will, presently as of Janu-
ary 1, 2023, result in closer alignment of the CCPA and GDPR. While the full implications are not yet 
known and may well be revised by intervening legislation or regulation, readers should remain apprised 
of potential implications.  However, the CCPA differs from the GDPR in some significant ways, 
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II.  SOURCES AND SUBJECTS OF PRIVACY LAW AND GUIDANCE 
Unlike many articles, this one will not enumerate all material elements of 
existing statutory law.  Rather, while such provisions will be summarized, the 
focus will be on presentation of informal but highly material authority which 
may be under the radar of more traditional discussions, as well as a discussion 
of whether the entire regimen provides substantial social value in itself and rel-
ative to the burdens imposed on private activity.   
In the authors’ experience, the term privacy is frequently employed to en-
compass one or more of the following, all of which involve a separate set of 
considerations and concerns: 
• protection of consumers from financial crimes associated with 
wrongful access to their identity and online credentials through 
both requirement of prompt notice of data breaches17 and substan-
tive regulation of steps to prevent them,18 as well as sporadic con-
sideration of class action litigation pertaining to non-compliance 
with such legislation;19 
• protection of individuals from government ‘spying’ on their online 
activities or other intrusions upon their freedom, stemming from the 
revelations by Edward Snowden regarding such activity by the US 
National Security Agency (NSA);20 
 
particularly with regard to the scope of application; the nature and extent of collection limitations; and 
rules concerning accountability.  Regarding the latter for example, the GDPR provides for obligations 
in relation to the appointment of Data Protection Officers, the maintenance of a register of processing 
activities, and the need for Data Protection Impact Assessments in specified circumstances.  Con-
versely, the CCPA does not specifically focus on accountability-related obligations, even though such 
provisions exist, such as the obligation for companies to train their staff that deal with requests from 
consumers.  It is also noteworthy that the core legal framework of the CCPA is quite different from 
the GDPR.  A fundamental principle of the GDPR is the requirement to have a “legal basis” for all 
processing of personal data.  That is not the case for the CCPA. Marini et al., Comparing Privacy 
Laws: GDPR v. CCPA, FUTURE OF PRIV. F., https://iapp.org/resources/article/comparing-privacy-
laws-gdpr-v-ccpa/, (last visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
17. See infra notes 52-57. 
18. Such as the Mass. and Fla. statutes discussed, infra notes 61–63. 
19. E.g., Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, (7th Cir. 2018); Collins v. Athens 
Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 307 Ga. 555 (2019).  Both cases preliminarily allowed class actions to proceed 
based upon a finding of shared, cognizable harm. 
20. A description of the rationale for GDPR by the person who is said to have triggered the 
effort to enact it: “Regulating the protection of data presumes that the collection of data in the first 
place was proper, was appropriate, that it doesn’t represent a threat or a danger, that it’s ok to spy on 
everyone all the time whether they are your customers or your citizens—so long as it never leaks, so 
long as only you are in control of what it is that you’ve stolen from everybody.” 
Steve Ranger, GDPR is missing the point, says Snowden, ZDNET, (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-is-missing-the-point-says-edward-snowden/. 
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• protection of individuals from commercial tracking and oversight 
of their online and physical21 activity, whether with respect to tar-
geted advertising or otherwise, by those authorized to possess their 
information; 
• protection of individuals from unknown and/or unwanted sharing 
of any information concerning them by those authorized to possess 
their information; and 
• special protection of children (typically those at or under age 1322) 
from any third party tracking or oversight of their online activities. 
In place of federal codification of authority or generally applicable federal 
statute, we have the following patchwork of state and federal approaches: 
• Pursuant to its contested, but ultimately recognized authority to reg-
ulate ‘unfair or deceptive trade practices’ under Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,23 the Federal Trade Com-
mission has provided guidance and more through a series of ‘con-
sent orders’ with names of allegedly offending companies,24 formal 
rule making,25 formal litigation such as the Wyndham case26 and 
 
21. Regulation of GPS or other geo-location tracking is an example.  COVID-19 has made this 
more than an academic issue.  Privacy concerns around geo-location data were prominent in Apple’s 
and Google’s plan to cooperatively create a system for COVID-19 contact tracing via IOS and Android 
mobile devices.  The plan calls for using Bluetooth signals to identify devices in proximity of the 
device of an infected person without identifying the precise location of the devices.  Apple and Google 
partner on COVID-19 contact tracing, APPLE NEWSROOM, (April 10, 2020), https://www.ap-
ple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/. 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq. 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 45; FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).  One of 
the authors engaged in a colloquy with former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff over the 
significance and sufficiency of the very broad language of Section 5 to the FTC’s efforts.  Agreeing 
with Sec. Chertoff that the FTC’s actions are “stretching the FTC’s mission beyond recognition,” the 
author observed that “[t]he FTC is doing a job which no other agency is prepared to do and on balance, 
doing it well.”  Interestingly, the author’s 2012 observation that “there is no federal or meaningful state 
law which gives businesses guidance as to how they are to safeguard consumer information” remains 
largely true at this writing (notwithstanding the state laws and administrative guidance) discussed 
herein and lends further support to the 2012 observation that “we need an approach which is more than 
‘better than nothing.’”  Martin B. Robins, Letter to the Editor, We Need a Better Approach to Protect-
ing Electronic Data, WALL ST. J., August 1, 2012, at A.12.  
24. E.g., The TJX Companies, Inc., File No.  072-3055, (March 27, 2008).  In a recent statement, 
the FTC made clear that it intended to be even more specific in its orders regarding required security 
practices and to require direct oversight of such practices by governing bodies and senior management.  
Andrew Smith, New and improved FTC data security orders: Better guidance for companies, better protec-
tion for consumers, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2020/01/new-improved-ftc-data-security-orders-better-guidance. 
25. E.g., the “Red Flags Rule” found at 16 C.F.R. § 681 et seq. 
26. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 236. 
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informal, but influential recommendations.27 A particular focus of 
the FTC is the adherence of companies to the privacy policies 
which they post.28   
• Pursuant to its direct authority to enforce the Childrens’ Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act, the FTC promulgates rules and brings pro-
ceedings to enforce the Act where information collection from or 
about children has exceeded legal limits;  
• As discussed infra, virtually every state has enacted some form of 
data breach notification law; 
• Several, but by no means all, states have enacted substantive re-
quirements governing companies’ obligations to secure personal 
information;29 
• Led by California through its widely publicized CCPA, several 
states30 regulate the ability of those collecting personal information 
to share it with others without the informed consent of the subject,31 
and provide such subjects with the ability to prevent such sharing. 
As noted in the introduction, there are several other federal statutes which 
are pertinent to this area, but which are analytically distinct from those which 
are discussed here in detail.32 
 
27. E.g., Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, (October 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/protecting-
personal-information-guide-business. 
28. The recently concluded Facebook episode and preceding consent decree discussed infra 
notes 76–77 and accompanying text reflect the importance of avoiding misleading disclosures in pri-
vacy policies or elsewhere.   
Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief, U.S. v. Facebook, Inc., D. D.C. (2019) 
(No. 19-cv-2184) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3109_facebook_com-
plaint_filed_7-24-19.pdf.  The authors frequently advise clients that the best way to encounter prob-
lems with the FTC is to fail to follow one’s own policy. 
29. E.g., infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text on state substantive law. 
30. Nev. Leg. 220, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019); Me. Leg. 946, 2019 Leg., 129th Sess. 
(Me. 2019) (An Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information currently applicable only 
to internet service providers, and requiring an opt-in from data subjects to allow the sharing of their 
information).  Similar legislation is pending in several other states, most notably Washington State. 
31. Through privacy policies and related disclosures, discussed infra notes 119–132.  
32. Pursuant to its direct authority under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 
227 et seq., the Federal Communications Commission enforces prohibitions of unwanted telephone 
(especially mobile) phone and text marketing efforts.  The focus of this law is more on helping con-
sumers to avoid annoyance and wasted phone plan minutes than privacy.  At this writing, the Supreme 
Court of the United States agreed to entertain a constitutional challenge to the TCPA. See Barr v. Am. 
Ass’n of Political Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).  Pursuant to dedicated federal statutes such as 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act “HITECH”, 42 U.S.C. § 
201 et seq., and Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, several federal agencies, including, but not limited to the 
FTC, provide special oversight of personal information security in the health care and financial services 
fields. 
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III.  EUROPEAN UNION GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
While the GDPR is, for the most part, beyond the scope of this article and 
the subject of a plethora of scholarship,33 in light of the manner and extent to 
which it is shaping both the nature of the discussion around privacy and specific 
US legislation,34 it is essential to understand its general confines.  Critically, the 
law applies, without exception for de minimus contact, to all collection of the 
personal information of European Union (‘EU’) and United Kingdom citizens, 
regardless of whether the party collecting such data has a physical presence in 
the EU or United Kingdom.35 
Enacted shortly after the revelations of NSA spying on Americans and in 
keeping with the European emphasis on individual privacy, the law is com-
prised of 99 ‘Articles.’36  The gravamen of the law consists of: 
• a requirement for clear disclosure, devoid of legalese and obfusca-
tion, of what information is being collected, with whom it is to be 
shared, and why it is to be shared;37 
• a separate requirement of affirmative opt-in for data collection and 
uses that are ancillary to the services requested by the data subject, 
such as the use of location tracking technology38 (if maps or direc-
tions are not requested by the data subject); 
• a requirement for the opt-in to use of ‘cookies’ or computer code 
files placed on the devices of website users by website operators;39  
 
33. E.g., DAVID ZETOONY, THE EU GDPR: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
(2018). 
34. And in the opinion of the authors likely to heavily influence the construction of US legisla-
tion, at least in the first instance. 
35. Subject to potential change as the Brexit is effectuated. 
36. General Data Protection Regulation, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-info.eu/, (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
37. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 12–13. 
38. Not expressly addressed within any GDPR article, but viewed by commentators as implicit 
in the consent requirement of Art. 7 and discussed in Recital 25 of pending ePrivacy Regulation.  David 
Meyer, What the GDPR will mean for companies tracking location, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PRO., (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-the-gdpr-will-mean-for-companies-tracking-location/.  Of 
course, this issue has assumed even greater significance in the wake of COVID-19, as policy-makers 
grapple with technological measures to contain such diseases. 
39. GDPR, supra note 3, at recital 30 and separate Cookie Directive. Cookies, the GDPR, and 
the ePrivacy Directive, PROTON TECH. AG, https://gdpr.eu/cookies/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).  Note 
that some of the related regulations have yet to be issued.  Since cookies are generally dropped at the 
moment a user loads a website and prior to the user having an opportunity to navigate to and review a 
privacy policy, a consent to cookies is generally separate from the consent to other data handling prac-
tices described in the privacy policy.  A ‘cookie banner’ usually looks something like this: “We use 
cookies on this website to improve functionality and performance, to analyse traffic to the website and 
to enable social media features.  To learn more please see our Cookies Policy [hyperlinked] for details.”  
The banner should require an action indicating consent of cookies prior to the placement on the user’s 
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• a requirement that individuals affirmatively opt-in to the stated col-
lections and sharing;40 
• a requirement that individuals be able to erase information pertain-
ing to them;41 
• an individual ‘right to be forgotten’ or prevent their name from 
coming up in internet searches;42 
• a requirement that collectors of data ‘map’ it to establish where it 
goes, whether to web hosts, analytics firms, or otherwise;43 
• a requirement that some data collectors formally designate and fully 
empower a ‘data protection officer’ with full responsibility and au-
thority for compliance;44 
• a requirement that data breaches be reported to EU authorities 
within 72 hours;45  
• a requirement that anyone entrusting personal information to a third 
party enter into a written ‘data processing agreement’ with them 
providing for appropriate technical and organizational safe-
guards;46 
• a requirement for a formal incident response plan to deal with 
breaches;47 
• specific requirements around transfer of EU personal data to ‘inad-
equate’ countries, of which the US is one, requiring a recognized 
transfer mechanism, which in the US customarily involves either 
 
device.  Emerging practice is to have a menu of cookies separated by function and identified as “op-
tional” or “necessary” with an opt-in toggle available for each.  In a press release on October 1, 2019, 
regarding the Planet49 case, the European Union’s Court of Justice explained that pre-checked con-
sents for cookies do not equate to affirmative opt-in consent, and that informed consent includes know-
ing the purpose and duration of the cookies as well as whether the information is shared with third 
parties.  Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, Storing cookies requires internet users’ 
active consent (1 October 2019), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-
10/cp190125en.pdf. 
40. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 6, 7, and 13.  In an early 2019 case involving Google, it was 
made clear that opt-in means opt-in, as Google was fined 50 million Euros for pre-checking consent 
boxes.  Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s Data Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/technology/google-europe-gdpr-fine.html.  See 
also Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 39. 
41. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 17; GDPR, supra note 3, at recitals 65–66. 
42. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 17(2); GDPR, supra note 3, at recital 66. 
43. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 30. 
44. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 37. 
45. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 33–34. 
46. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 24, 28, 78, and 81.  In practice, DPAs often contain elabo-
ration regarding specific measures which are utilized.  Additionally, the Standard Contractual Clauses 
(controller-processor) require, in Appendix 2, a description of the technical and organizational security 
measures implemented by the data importer. 
47. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 32–33. Article 33’s 72-hour reporting obligation effectively 
requires existence of a formal response plan. 
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self-certification to the ‘Privacy Shield’ frameworks48 or compli-
ance with ‘Standard Contractual Clauses’;49 
• distinctions between those functioning as ‘controllers’ and ‘proces-
sors’;50 and 
• fines for non-compliance of up to the greater of 20 million Euros or 
4% of worldwide revenue.51 
The overlap between the various US laws and the more comprehensive 
GDPR will become apparent. 
IV.  BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 
While the basic concept is largely self-explanatory insofar as it involves 
notice to impacted individuals, statutes vary widely with respect to matters such 
as: 
• Numerical threshold for reporting to the state: many states apply 
their laws in cases involving a threshold number of impacted rec-
ords (in California and Florida, for example, that is 500 records52).  
Until very recently, Illinois did not have such a threshold, but has 
recently enacted one; 
• Manner of reporting (to affected persons): California requires at 
least 10 point type and specifies headings53 while Illinois is not as 
specific, but requires contact information for credit reporting agen-
cies and the FTC and prohibits inclusion of the number of impacted 
Illinois residents;54 
• Timing and Order of Notification: the time frame within which no-
tification must be sent to affected individuals, the time frame within 
 
48. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 46.  The viability of the Shield and Standard Clauses is 
currently the subject of EU litigation.  Caitlin Fennessy, The Privacy Shield review and its potential to 
impact Schrems II, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PRO., (Nov. 5, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-privacy-
shield-review-and-its-potential-to-impact-schrems-ii/. 
49. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 44–47.  An interesting example of the overlap between US 
and EU law is presented by the FTC Order in which a company was taken to task for falsely claiming 
that it was a participant in the authorized Privacy Shield program.  Press Release, Federal Trade Com-
mission, FTC Charges Nevada Company with Falsely Claiming Participation in the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/11/ftc-charges-nevada-company-
falsely-claiming-participation-eu-us. 
50. GDPR, supra note 3, at articles 24–29. 
51. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 83. 
52. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.80, 1798.82 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. § 501.171 (2014).  
Relatedly, some states, e.g., New Jersey, have a separate threshold for reporting to credit agencies.  See 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(f) (West 2019). 
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29.  
54. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1–530/30 (2006).  
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which the breach must be reported to the state, and the timing rela-
tive to each other55 varies; 
• Nature of information accessed: in California, the statute is trig-
gered by ‘unauthorized’ acquisition of computerized data that com-
promises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal infor-
mation maintained by the entity.  Meanwhile, in Florida, the 
standard is essentially the same, with the critical exception that no-
tice is not required in cases where ‘the covered entity reasonably 
determines that the breach has not and will not likely result in iden-
tity theft or any other financial harm to the individuals.’56  The key 
takeaway is that when the situation potentially arises, those respon-
sible for compliance must look at the exact language of the stat-
utes(s) in question to determine whether they are triggered simply 
by access or if something more, such as evidence of fraud, is re-
quired;  
• Remedial action beyond notice: for the most part, as is the case in 
California,57 this involves provision of free credit monitoring for 
some specified interval, although not all states impose such a spe-
cific requirement. 
Companies experiencing such an event have no choice but to refer to each 
statute in any location where it has any affected customers. 
V.  AFFIRMATIVE SECURITY AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
In contrast to breach notification laws, which are not relevant unless and 
until a breach occurs,58 affirmative security laws require that steps be taken to 
prevent such occurrence.  The most notable laws are:  
 
55. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(c)(1) (West 2019) (which says notice must be provided to 
the state in advance of the notice to the affected individuals); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § III-701 (2015) 
(requiring notice to the State of Louisiana within 10 days of distribution of notice to affected individ-
uals). 
56. FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4)(c) (2019).  In California, “Breach of the security of the system” 
means unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, 
or integrity of personal information maintained by the entity.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(g).  Mean-
while, the Illinois standard incudes the above plus biometric information.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5. 
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d)(2)(G) (West 2020). 
58. Although the different statutes contain different definitions of ‘breach’, in some, mere ac-
cess is sufficient to trigger the statute, while in others, there must be evidence that information was 
actually taken. 
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• The recent New York Shield law,59 which contains some general 
affirmative security obligations60 along with an enhanced version 
of the prior breach notification law which now covers anyone with 
personal information pertaining to New York residents, regardless 
of whether they have a place of business in New York, and adds 
biometric information to the definition of personal information; 
• The “Florida Information Protection Act of 2014”61 which simply 
requires the taking of ‘reasonable’ security measures while elabo-
rating upon the previous sparse breach notice law; and 
• The more comprehensive Massachusetts version, “Standards for 
The Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Com-
monwealth”62 which prescribes various technical measures such as: 
o prevention of access to sensitive information by termi-
nated employees; 
o meaningful oversight of service providers; 
o physical access restrictions; and 
 
59. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Protect-
ing New Yorkers Against Data Security Breaches, (July 25, 2019), https://www.gover-
nor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-protecting-new-yorkers-against-data-security-
breaches (adding new Sec. 899-BB and revising Sec. 899-AA of General Business Law). 
60. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-BB (MCKINNEY 2020). Sec. 2 of 899-BB states:  
Reasonable security requirement.  (a) Any person or business that owns or licenses computerized data 
which includes private information of a resident of New York shall develop, implement and maintain 
reasonable safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of the private information 
including, but not limited to, disposal of data.  (b) A person or business shall be deemed to be in 
compliance with paragraph (a) of this subdivision if it either: (i) is a compliant regulated entity as 
defined in subdivision one of this section; or (ii) implements a data security program that includes the 
following: (A) reasonable administrative safeguards such as the following, in which the person or 
business: (1) designates one or more employees to coordinate the security program; (2) identifies rea-
sonably foreseeable internal and external risks; (3) assesses the sufficiency of safeguards in place to 
control the identified risks; (4) trains and manages employees in the security program practices and 
procedures; (5) selects service providers capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards, and requires 
those safeguards by contract; and (6) adjusts the security program in light of business changes or new 
circumstances; and (B) reasonable technical safeguards such as the following, in which the person or 
business: (1) assesses risks in network and software design; (2) assesses risks in information pro-
cessing, transmission and storage; (3) detects, prevents and responds to attacks or system failures; and 
(4) regularly tests and monitors the effectiveness of key controls, systems and procedures; and (C) 
reasonable physical safeguards such as the following, in which the person or business: (1) assesses 
risks of information storage and disposal; (2) detects, prevents and responds to intrusions; (3) protects 
against unauthorized access to or use of private information during or after the collection, transporta-
tion and destruction or disposal of the information; and (4) disposes of private information within a 
reasonable amount of time after it is no longer needed for business purposes by erasing electronic 
media so that the information cannot be read or reconstructed. 
61. FLA. STAT. § 501.171. 
62. 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2009) et seq. 
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o encryption of material in transit and stored on laptops 
and similar devices, deployment of malware protec-
tion, and meaningful user authentication protocols.63 
In the same vein are recommendations by the California Attorney Gen-
eral.64  While these are not ‘law’ in the traditional sense of being a permissible 
subject of enforcement litigation, the authors view them as very useful guidance 
for clients65 who desire to avoid regulatory attention and mitigate that which is 
unavoidable.  While there is no shortage of general admonitions dictating the 
use of ‘good’ security practice, the California Attorney General recommenda-
tions go further insofar as they direct attention to matters such as user and ad-
ministrator privileges, specific settings, and ongoing testing.   
Illinois has a largely unique66 statute governing collection and use of bio-
metric, or physical characteristic data such as fingerprints and ‘face geome-
try,’67 which requires individual consent to most uses, including those by em-
ployers.  Claims under this law68 have been determined by the Illinois Supreme 
Court to support class actions69 even without specific proof of harm.  Similar 
statutes are under consideration in other states.  It seems questionable whether 
this statute would, absent some sort of individual notice and consent, allow 
 
63. 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03-.04 (2009). 
64. Kamala Harris, California Data Breach Report, CAL. DEP’T JUST., (Feb. 2016), 
https://oag.ca.gov/breachreport2016. 
65. Much Needed Meat on Security Requirement Bones: Report from California’s Attorney 
General, FISHERBROYLES, LLP, (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.fisherbroyles.com/much-needed-meat-
on-security-requirement-bones-report-from-californias-attorney-general/. 
66. Washington State has very recently enacted its own version. WASH. REV. CODE. § 
19.375.010 (2017) et seq.; see also Kristine Argentine, Paul Yovanic Jr., The Growing Number of 
Biometric Privacy Laws and the Post-COVID Consumer Class Action Risks for Businesses, JDSUPRA 
(June 9, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-growing-number-of-biometric-privacy-
62648/. (Illinois is apparently the only such state to allow a private right of action). 
67. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008) et seq.  A class action lawsuit under this statute was very 
recently settled for a $550 million payment.  Andrew G. Simpson, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to 
Settle Biometric Privacy Violation Concerns, INS. J., (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.insurancejour-
nal.com/news/national/2020/01/30/556920.htm; In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Liti-
gation, No. 15-cv-03747-JD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139051, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017). 
68. In a case filed in Illinois during the writing of this article, the contemplated class plaintiff 
alleges that IBM  violated the statute by incorporating his and other facial photos into a data base, 
which it made available to third parties, when it failed to obtain any consent for such usage.  Class 
Action Complaint, Janecyk et al v.  International Business Machines Corp., Ill. Cir. Ct. (January 22, 
2020) (No. 2020CH00833).  Following the filing of such action, IBM and Microsoft revised their 
internal policies to prohibit sharing of such data with law enforcement.  Alex Hern, IBM quits facial-
recognition market over police racial-profiling concerns, THE GUARDIAN, (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/09/ibm-quits-facial-recognition-market-over-law-
enforcement-concerns. 
69. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 129 N.E.3d 1197 (2019). 
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employee or patron temperature checking programs of the kind seen by many 
as key to mitigating coronavirus exposure.  It is also possible that preemptive 
federal legislation will be enacted.  As noted,70 the authors advocate for the 
enactment of such legislation, and bills are pending. 
A federal judge’s skepticism regarding a substantial settlement of a class 
action suit under the Illinois statute, based upon his concern that it does not 
reflect $100 per occurrence penalties for willful violations, portends increasing 
importance of the statute.71 
On a related note, several other class action suits are now pending.  Most 
notably, the American Civil Liberties Union has brought its own action under 
the Illinois statute against a private company, known as Clearview, on behalf 
of all impacted persons, specifically mentioning victims of domestic violence 
and undocumented immigrants as being entitled to relief based upon the sharing 
of their facial and other information with seemingly anyone who would pay for 
it, including law enforcement.72 
Under all state laws and private organization standards,73 encryption 
(scrambling) of sensitive information in transit and in storage is recognized as 
at least highly desirable, if not formally required. 
VI.  FTC RULES AND ADMONITIONS—DISCLOSURE–BASED AND OTHER 
The FTC has emphasized conformance to posted policies to the extent that 
the greatest exposure for companies is to provide false assurances such as ‘we 
don’t sell your information’ when someone does so, or ‘your information is 
perfectly safe with us’ when it is simply impossible for anyone to provide such 
 
70. See infra note 167. 







72. Complaint, American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. Clearview AI, Inc., Ill. Cir. Ct. (2020) 
(No. 9337839).  
73. Such as the National Institute of Science and Technology.  NIST Links Federal Encryption 
Testing to International Standard for First Time, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH, (April 30, 
2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/04/nist-links-federal-encryption-testing-interna-
tional-standard-first-time; see also Karen Scarfone, Murugiah Souppaya, Matt Sexton, Guide to Stor-
age Encryption Technologies for End User Devices, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH, 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-111.pdf. As for the desira-
ble/not formally required distinction: CCPA, for example, has a private right of action for breaches of 
“nonencrypted or unredacted or nonredacted” personal information. 1798.150(a)(1).  (If encrypted, it’s 
not a breach.)  Such is the case as well with New York’s SHIELD Act—the definition of personal 
information subject to the law is unencrypted data. 
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assurances.  The FTC states directly: “Think your company doesn’t make any 
privacy claims? Think again — and reread your privacy policy to make sure 
you’re honoring the promises you’ve pledged.”74  
While there are numerous FTC enforcement actions based upon this edict,75 
perhaps the most notable is the ongoing Facebook case beginning with a 2012 
Consent Order requiring conformance76 and culminating in a 2019 $5 billion 
fine for disregard of obligations under the earlier Order.77  Customarily, FTC 
Consent Orders have a 20-year term and require improvement efforts.  For 
example,  
IT IS ORDERED that respondent, directly or through any corporation, 
subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the advertising, 
marketing, promotion, offering for sale, or sale of any product or 
service, in or affecting commerce, shall, no later than the date of service 
of this order, establish and implement, and thereafter maintain, a 
comprehensive information security program that is reasonably 
designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of 
personal information collected from or about consumers.78 
While deceptive practices are the customary focus of FTC action, the 
agency will sometimes address problems not involving deception, such as 
breaches resulting from the use of obsolete technology under the ‘unfair’ prong 
of ‘unfair or deceptive trade practices.’  The most prominent example is the 
TJX episode,79 where the issue was a large data breach resulting in substantial 
consumer loss, apparently resulting from the transmission of consumer data 
within and from retail stores over a wireless network which was based upon 
something other than the most recent protocol.80  The FTC’s involvement in 
 
74. Consumer Privacy, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/busi-
ness-center/privacy-and-security/consumer-privacy, (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
75. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).  The Wyndham case is 
in a sense the best example.  However, the fact that it involved formal federal court action instead of a 
consent order and involved outright disregard of three data breaches in the face of a privacy policy 
containing broad assurances of security, makes the case something of an outlier. 
76. FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (Aug. 10, 
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-face-
book. 
77. While the FTC and Facebook have in fact reached a settlement, at this writing, the settle-
ment is still under consideration by the courts, in part because of the scope of the release.  Ryan Tracy 
& Emily Glazer, Landmark Facebook Settlement Still Working Its Way Through Court, WALL ST. J., 
(Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/landmark-facebook-settlement-still-working-its-way-
through-court-11578652202?mod=hp_lead_pos4. 
78. The TJX Companies, Inc., FTC Matter/File No.  072-3055, (March 27, 2008). 
79. Id. 
80. 73 Fed. Reg. 18281 (Apr. 3, 2008). 
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technology selection, absent misstatement, is quite unusual, although it does 
not appear that this approach has been used in other cases where there was not 
an issue regarding misstatement. 
Critically, while they provide a great deal of useful guidance and allow data 
handlers to proceed in good faith, FTC Consent Orders are of no formal 
precedential value in court proceedings and of questionable value in other FTC 
proceedings.  Nevertheless, one ignores them at their own risk, especially if a 
problem arises, whether through a data breach, consumer complaint, or 
otherwise.   
The FTC also engages in conventional rule-making activity in several 
situations in which the issue is data security.  Among other things, the FTC has 
promulgated a Red Flags Rule81 to advise companies when they must pursue 
the possibility of identity theft (i.e., Red Flag means a pattern, practice, or spe-
cific activity that indicates the possible existence of identity theft) and a 
Disposal Rule82 governing physical and electronic disposal of consumer 
information.  Another example is the FTC’s adoption83 of the so-called 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, requiring measures to secure 
credit/debit card credentials and other very sensitive material. 
It is also worth reiterating the value of the FTC’s informal guidance 
reflected in the public statements of commissioners and publications,84 apart 
from the more formal activity noted above.  Once again, in practice, whatever 
may be the formal legal effect, substantial adherence to such guidance is an 
 
81. See, e.g., the “Red Flags Rule” found at 16 CFR § 681 et seq.; FTC Issues Amended Rule 
on Identity Theft Red Flags, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (Nov. 30, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-issues-amended-rule-identity-theft-red-
flags. 
82. 82 Fed. Reg. 52846 (Nov. 15, 2017). 
83. Leslie Fair, Wyndham’s settlement with the FTC: What it means for businesses – an con-







84. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-infor-
mation.pdf, (last visited Sept. 23, 2020). The FTC summarizes its Protecting Personal Information 
guidebook as follows: “A sound data security plan is built on 5 key principles: 1. TAKE STOCK.  
Know what personal information you have in your files and on your computers.  2. SCALE DOWN.  
Keep only what you need for your business.  3. LOCK IT.  Protect the information that you keep.  4. 
PITCH IT.  Properly dispose of what you no longer need.  5. PLAN AHEAD.  Create a plan to respond 
to security incidents.” 
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important means of both reducing the likelihood of a problem such as a data 
breach and demonstrating good faith if and when one does arise. 
A separate source of informal guidance in this area is the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its capacity as regulator of mobile 
phone carriers.  Specifically, the FCC has taken steps to ensure that such 
carriers provide proper disclosure of, and obtain meaningful consent to, the 
tracking of users’ whereabouts through GPS and similar geo-location capability 
built into phones and not sell such information to data brokers at all.85  As noted 
below, addressing location tracking in privacy policies is essential but must be 
done in conjunction with the FCC’s position.  In that such technology is seen 
by many86 as a key part of the strategy for control of pandemics and epidemics, 
and is already being used for that purpose by a number of governments,87 the 
authors anticipate further attention from other agencies. 
In the same vein is the recent report of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission discussing what it has observed as the optimal security practices 
at financial services firms which it audits.88  While these observations clearly 
are not law, they are yet another example of prudent steps that companies 
should consider.  Notably, they have nothing to do with regulation of permitted 
uses of information by such firms, but are only thoughts on how best to protect 
it from unauthorized access.   
VII.  CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT (“COPPA”)89 
Enacted in 1998 and, to this day, the only federal statute dealing with lim-
iting the ability of marketers to directly or indirectly track and utilize the online 
activities of Americans, the text of this law is remarkably sparse and vague.  
Applicable to web activities of children under 13, it calls for ‘verifiable parental 
 
85. Jon Brodkin, Verizon and AT&T will stop selling your phone’s location to data brokers, 
CONDÉ NAST, (June 19, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/06/verizon-and-att-will-stop-
selling-your-phones-location-to-data-brokers/. 
86. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying discussion; See comments infra note 167. 
87. Schechner et al., Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s 




girgCOBt7jdg1z5kewKFboyP1hLsV0R3wWDVKgQ%3D%3D&reflink=article_email_share.  One 
wonders how this activity is viewed by the FCC. 
88. Press Release, SEC, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations Publishes 
Observations on Cybersecurity and Resiliency Practices (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-20. 
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505; 16 C.F.R. § 312 et seq. 
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consent’ for data collection in the case of ‘websites or online services’ directed 
to ‘children’: 
The term “verifiable parental consent” means any reasonable effort 
(taking into consideration available technology), including a request for 
authorization for future collection, use, and disclosure described in the 
notice, to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the operator’s 
personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices, and au-
thorizes the collection, use, and disclosure, as applicable, of personal 
information and the subsequent use of that information before that in-
formation is collected from that child. 
… 
The term “website or online service directed to children” means- 
(i) a commercial website or online service that is targeted to children; 
or 
(ii) that portion of a commercial website or online service that is tar-
geted to children.90 
A good deal is left to the interpretation of marketers—i.e., ‘reasonable ef-
forts,’ ‘targeted to children’—who unsurprisingly have taken liberties with the 
law, a tendency exacerbated by a lack of regulatory attention which seems to 
be rapidly changing.  The FTC has appropriately recently responded with en-
forcement action via a $170 million settlement in a case involving Google’s 
YouTube subsidiary and allegedly blatant abuse, where salespeople were 
openly promoting their site as the best way to reach children91 which bespeaks 
the increasing significance of the law.   
In addition to the fine, the settlement also required operational changes such 
as:  
• limitation of data collection from anyone watching children’s vid-
eos; 
• modification of features appearing on such videos such as com-
ment, live chat, and saving to playlists; 
• omission of ads from children’s videos which are served based upon 
online activity; and 
 
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(9), (10). 
91. Google and YouTube Will Pay Record $170 Million for Alleged Violations of Children’s 
Privacy Law, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations. 
ROBINS_BOOHER_MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/21  2:57 PM 
188 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:2 
 
• requiring video producers to designate videos as being for children 
or adults.92  
While nebulous and perhaps somewhat dated references such as ‘online 
services’ and the ambiguity of the terms noted above complicate efforts to ap-
ply the statute in all of the situations where it is most needed, it is still a signif-
icant consideration with respect to marketing efforts directed to younger people 
and must not be ignored.93  It must be emphasized that COPPA does not 
preempt any other state or federal law, all of which must be observed to the 
extent applicable.   
Whether Google or YouTube actually changed its practices as a result of 
the $170 million settlement of the FTC case discussed earlier in this section is 
unclear.  In the second quarter of 2020, an Illinois resident brought suit seeking 
class action status against Google in California alleging violations of COPPA 
and the Illinois biometric statute94 resulting from Google’s provision of free 
Chromebook machines to schoolchildren and alleged programming of these 
machines to surreptitiously track internet activity and perform facial scans.95 
At this writing, a bill sponsored by Sens. Hawley and Markey (the latter of 
whom was the primary sponsor of the original COPPA) is pending in Congress, 
although prospects are clouded by the COVID-19 situation.  Said bill would 
maintain parental consent for the collection of data of children under 13, add a 
new prohibition on the collection of information of children ages 13-15 years 
without such users’ consent, and make several of the other changes contem-
plated herein.96   
 
92. Natasha Singer, How YouTube Is Changing its Approach to Child Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, 
January 7, 2020, at B4. 
93. See infra notes 143-144 (containing the authors’ thoughts as to improvement of the statute). 
94. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008) et seq. 
95. Hayley Samsel, Google Facing Lawsuit Over Collection of Facial Scans, Personal Data 
From Children, 1105MEDIA INC., (April 7, 2020), https://securitytoday.com/arti-
cles/2020/04/07/google-facing-lawsuit-over-collection-of-facial-scans-personal-data-from-chil-
dren.aspx.  As an additional example of the spotty enforcement of COPPA, a respondent is accused of 
falsely stating that it was participating in a self-regulatory organization. FTC Dem Says Kids’ Privacy 
Programs Need More Scrutiny, LEXISNEXIS, (May 19, 2020), https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/1275121/ftc-dem-says-kids-privacy-programs-need-more-scrutiny.  The same source also indi-
cates the bipartisan interest in improvement. 
96. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Ed Markey, Senators Markey and Hawley Introduce Bipartisan 
Legislation to Update Children’s Online Privacy Rules (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.markey.sen-
ate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-and-hawley-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-update-
childrens-online-privacy-rules.  The United Kingdom has very recently enacted a GDPR-style law to 
deal with efforts pertaining to children.  As is the case with COPPA, observers note that the law re-
quires ‘a lot of judgment calls’ to be made.  UK Extends Privacy Law Patchwork With New Kids’ 
Rules, LEXISNEXIS, (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1237351/uk-extends-privacy-
law-patchwork-with-new-kids-rules. 
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VIII.  CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT (“CCPA”)97  
By far the most comprehensive US legislation dealing with information us-
age, CCPA became effective at January 1, 2020.  At this writing, there has been 
no formal judicial guidance as to its application.98  While it is the closest thing 
in US law to the GDPR, there are substantial differences.99  Most notably, these 
include a broader definition of personal information through inclusion of a 
‘household’ component, lack (at least nominally) of a general opt-in require-
ment, the incorporation of the DO NOT SELL opt-out mechanism, and a re-
quirement pursuant to legislation separate from but related to CCPA for data 
brokers to register with, and provide information to, the California Attorney 
General.100  CCPA applies to both consumers and business to business transac-
tions, but with a partial exemption until January 1, 2021 for the latter.101 
Some believe, with reasonable basis,102 that the legislation was enacted in 
large part to deal with the purported scandal associated with delivery of Face-
book information of millions of users to a UK professor in contravention of 
Facebook’s assurances and the subsequent use of such information in the 2016 
US presidential campaign.  This brought a spotlight to the involvement of in-
termediaries (middlemen) such as data brokers and aggregators.  In addition to 
the data broker registry requirement,103 the statute gives consumers self-help 
tools, which include: 
A consumer shall have the right to request that a business that collects 
a consumer’s personal information disclose to that consumer the cate-




97. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020). 
98. However, there have been promulgated final regulations.  Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20 § 999, 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-sub-final-text-of-regs.pdf 
99. CCPA vs. GDPR, WORKTABLE TECH. LTD., https://resources.workable.com/hr-
terms/ccpa-vs-gdpr, (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
100. Assemb. B. 1202, 2019, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
101. Amy S. Park & Aylin Kuzucan, An Amendment to the CCPA Provides a Welcome But 
Brief Reprieve for B2B Businesses, ALM MEDIA PROPERTIES, LLC, (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/10/25/an-amendment-to-the-ccpa-provides-a-welcome-but-
brief-reprieve-for-b2b-businesses/. 
102. Dipayan Ghosh, What You Need to Know About California’s New Data Privacy Law, 
HARV. BUS. REV., (July 11, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/what-you-need-to-know-about-californias-
new-data-privacy-law. 
103. Cal. Assemb. B. 1202. 
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020). 
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A consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete any 
personal information about the consumer which the business has col-
lected from the consumer.105 
 
A consumer shall have the right to request that a business that sells the 
consumer’s personal information, or that discloses it for a business pur-
pose, disclose to that consumer:  
1) The categories of personal information that the business col-
lected about the consumer. 
2) The categories of personal information that the business sold 
about the consumer and the categories of third parties to whom the 
personal information was sold, by category or categories of per-
sonal information for each third party to whom the personal infor-
mation was sold. 
3) The categories of personal information that the business dis-
closed about the consumer for a business purpose.106 
A consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a business that 
sells personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell 
the consumer’s personal information.  This right may be referred to as 
the right to opt-out.107 
There are many components of the legislation,108 only a few of which are 
quoted above, but in the authors’ view, the most important ones are as follows: 
• Broad application outside California: the law applies to any for-
profit entity (“business”) (i) with aggregate global revenue in ex-
cess of $25 million,109  (ii) that obtains the personal information (as 
defined in the act) of more than 50,000 California residents, or (iii) 
that derives 50% or more of its revenue by selling (as defined in the 
 
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a) (West 2020). 
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115 (West 2020). 
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2020). 
108. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/pri-
vacy/ccpa, (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (containing an official Attorney General summary). 
109. Some have suggested that the failure to limit application to companies with California-
derived revenue in excess of the threshold is a drafting error.  Perhaps this is the case, but the actual 
language does not presently support such conclusion and the only sensible position to be taken at this 
time is what is dictated by the actual language, namely all revenue is taken into account.  Further, the 
California Attorney General had the opportunity to clarify this point, but chose not to do so, in the draft 
regulations and on the CCPA Fact Sheet.  California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. DEP’T 
JUST.,  https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_re-
leases/CCPA%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2800000002%29.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).  
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act) the personal information of California residents.  The final 
prong is one which, in the authors’ experience, sometimes ensnares 
very small companies that process data of a relatively low number 
of consumers, in which case the application of CCPA is out of step 
with the apparent intent of the statute to protect consumers in sub-
stantial numbers; 
• A requirement, similar to that of the GDPR, for clear, non-legalistic 
disclosure in privacy policies and elsewhere of what information is 
being collected, what is being shared, with whom, and why.110  The 
drastic increase in the use of the Zoom video conferencing service 
during the COVID-19 outbreak prompted at least two class action 
lawsuits by users, challenging the sufficiency of the disclosures in 
light of allegedly undisclosed provision of user information to Fa-
cebook;111 
• An ambiguous provision not found in the GDPR, intended to allow 
consumers to opt out of ‘sales’ of their information through man-
datory inclusion on websites and in mobile applications of a DO 
NOT SELL button and, in some cases not involving a California 
physical location or direct connection to California consumers, a 
toll free phone number.  However, this provision leaves open to 
interpretation by courts and in regulations112 whether a sale includes 
transfers to third parties such as web hosts, fulfillment vendors, and 
analytics vendors absent direct monetary remuneration; the 
 
110. To some extent, this notice requirement is being implemented through paper notices to 
customers in a physical location.  Nat Ives, Privacy Warnings Come to Brick-and-Mortar; Emission 
Brags will be the Next Big Packaging Play, DOW JONES CO., https://cmo.cre-
atesend1.com/t/ViewEmail/d/484C228B20C823A72540EF23F30FEDED/4B7310DCAEF300FE62
AF25ACF5E3F0AC?mod=article_inline&mod=hp_minor_pos1, (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
111. E.g., Cullen v. Zoom Video Communs., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78745, Case No. 20-
CV-02155-LHK (N.D. Cal., April 24, 2020); Taylor v.  Zoom Video Communications, Inc., Case 
No. 20-cv-02170, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020) (subsequently consolidated with 6 other class actions).  
Most of the suits also allege claims associated with failure to safeguard personal information.  On 
the date that this article was finalized, November 10, 2020, Zoom and the FTC agreed to a settle-
ment of charges pending before the latter which provided no monetary relief but committed Zoom 
- through entry of an injunctive order - to terms which prohibit misstatements as to security prac-
tices and data sharing and enhance technical measures such as encryption of stored recordings. 
This settlement has no impact on any of the private litigation which is pending. 
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2020).  A sale is defined in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 
(West 2020) as “selling, renting, releasing, disclosing, disseminating, making available, transferring, 
or otherwise communicating orally, in writing, or by electronic or other means, a consumer’s personal 
information to another business or a third party for monetary or other valuable consideration.”  The 
‘valuable consideration’ portion—among other things—leaves a great deal of room for interpretation. 
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differences in approach among major internet companies are 
starkly apparent;113  
• The above ambiguity is compounded by a confusing exception to 
the DO NOT SELL requirement related to obligations for sharing 
of data with ‘service providers’;114 
• While nominally absent from the statute’s text (in contrast to the 
GDPR), an opt-in provision is at least part of best practices for es-
tablishing adequacy of disclosures; arguably the best way to estab-
lish provision of required notices is to point to express agreement 
to their terms;115 
• A prohibition on discrimination—through pricing or otherwise—
against those who exercise the DO NOT SELL option;116  
• A private right of action for damages attributable to violations in 
connection with certain unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, 
or disclosure of a consumer’s nonencrypted or nonredacted per-
sonal information.117  
At this very early stage, it is not clear how the law will be enforced.  What 
is clear is that it must be dealt with in privacy policies governing most collection 
of personal information from California residents.118  
 
113. Kim Lyons, No one is ready for California’s new consumer privacy law, VOX MEDIA, 
(Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/31/21039228/california-ccpa-facebook-mi-
crosoft-gdpr-privacy-law-consumer-data-regulation. 
114. For the purpose of the DO NOT SELL exception, a service provider is: (1) A legal entity 
organized for profit; (2) That processes personal information on behalf of a business; (3) To which the 
business discloses a consumer’s personal information for a business purpose.  (4) Pursuant to a written 
contract that prohibits the legal entity from selling, retaining, using, or disclosing the personal infor-
mation for any purpose (including a commercial purpose) other than performing the services specified 
in the contract.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2020) (right to opt out), § 1798.135 (“Do Not 
Sell” requirement), § 1798.140(d) (definition of ‘business purpose’), § 1798.140(t)(1) (definition of 
‘sell’), § 1798.140(v) (definition of ‘service provider’), § 1798.140(w) (definition of ‘third party’).  At 
this writing, there is a stark difference of opinion among major technology companies over the appli-
cation of this section. Patience Haggin, Facebook Won’t Change Web Tracking in Response to Cali-
fornia Privacy Law, Wall St. J., (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wont-change-
web-tracking-in-response-to-california-privacy-law-11576175345?mod=searchre-
sults&page=1&pos=13.  The final regulations issued by California’s Attorney General do not resolve 
this ambiguity.  As Final Calif. Privacy Regs Drop, Enforcement Fights Loom, LEXISNEXIS, (June 12, 
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1282100/as-final-calif-privacy-regs-drop-enforcement-
fights-loom.  Presumably, it will be resolved fairly promptly through legal proceedings of some sort.   
115. For those subject to the GDPR’s opt-in requirement, the matter is effectively moot—it is 
likely to be easier to have all opt in than to present separate approaches to users, based upon their 
location. 
116. It is not clear how this prohibition is applied in cases where sharing of information is 
essential to proper site or application functionality. 
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020). 
118. Infra note 130 and accompanying Appendix text (discussing one company’s equivocal 
response). 
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It is also clear that allocation of responsibility for compliance (and liability 
for non-compliance) will be an important aspect of contractual practice where 
personal information is involved.  The latter will include not only initial collec-
tion and sharing activity, but also responsibility for handling of data subject 
requests.  While all sharing of personal information requires careful disclosure, 
the highest level of scrutiny will go to situations involving some sort of direct 
monetary or other consideration.  It is quite possible that some companies will 
respond to the CCPA as others have to the GDPR, namely taking technical steps 
to block access by residents in those jurisdictions.  While marketplace consid-
erations will not always permit such action, for some companies having actual 
and anticipated minimal sales attributable to California, it remains a potential 
option. 
IX.  ROLE OF PRIVACY POLICIES 
The above authority is translated into action and communication (and some-
times liability) through online and paper privacy policies setting forth how each 
company obtains and handles user information119  As noted above120 the FTC 
has made non-compliance with one’s own policy a focal point of their enforce-
ment activity, so these documents are ultimately contractual in nature.   
The policy excerpts contained in the Appendix reflect the typical contents 
of such documents,121 both in general and in response to the new dictates of the 
CCPA.  Such items should always include: 
• a description of information being collected and explanation of why 
such materials are needed for the conduct of business;122 
• an explanation of what is being done with the information, specifi-
cally, with whom it is being shared and for what purpose;123 
 
119. Terms of Use (TOU) documents are usually presented with privacy policy documents, but 
serve different purposes.  TOU’s usually contain commercial terms such as sales tax treatment, war-
ranties and disclaimers and return policy and where public submissions are permitted or encouraged, 
specify what is off limits such as obscene or violent materials or materials which infringe anyone’s 
copyright.  The question of screening for untruths or ‘fake news’ which may impact political races—
or even whether to accept political ads at all—is often addressed in this context.  For example, Face-
book’s Community Standards “ban hate speech, harmful content and content designed to intimidate 
voters or stop them from exercising their right to vote.” Emily Glazer, Facebook to Keep Targeted 
Political Ads but Give Users More Control, Wall St. J., (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/facebook-to-keep-targeted-political-ads-but-will-give-users-more-control-
11578567603?mod=hp_lead_pos6. 
120. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 74. 
121. Which must always reflect actual and intended practice. 
122. Appendix Sections A–C. 
123. Appendix Section D. 
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• a disclosure of website activity monitoring;124 
• either in the policy itself or related disclosure (such as a ‘cookie 
banner’ that appears when a site or application is first accessed), 
statement regarding use of persistent ‘cookies’ which are computer 
code files placed on user equipment which may allow user tracking 
across sites; their use is becoming increasingly controversial and 
being phased out in some quarters;125  
• potential or actual use of such information for targeting of advertis-
ing by third parties;126 
• an explanation that no complete assurance can be given as to the 
maintenance of security for the information;127 and 
• merger and acquisition disclosure128 dictated by state Attorney Gen-
eral Accord in Radio Shack bankruptcy case.129 
For companies meeting the CCPA thresholds, the other disclosures regard-
ing actual or potential ‘sales’ come into play.  In the materials provided, the 
company uses something of a hybrid approach to deal with the uncertainty 
around whether a sale encompasses transfers not involving monetary consider-
ation.  For example, while there is a ‘Do Not Sell’ home page link, which is 
required when there is a sale,130 the reference in the policy to that link, which 
is also required under the statute, is not labeled ‘Do Not Sell’ but rather as an 
‘opt-out’ of ‘sales.’ 
The best examples of genuine sales for which the DO NOT SELL election 
is pertinent involve data brokers who openly trade in databases possessing de-
mographic or other characteristics which are believed to facilitate the marketing 
efforts of their customers.  When such parties are involved, very strong disclo-
sures are essential. 
The California-specific language also reflects the ability of consumers to 
know what information has been collected with respect to them and to insist 
upon cessation of such collection.131 
 
124. Appendix Sections C & E. 
125. Bowdeya Tweh & Sahil Patel, Google Chrome to Phase Out Third-Party in Effort to Boost 
Privacy, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-chrome-to-phase-out-
third-party-cookies-in-effort-to-boost-privacy-11579026834?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1.  The 
title of the article reflects Google’s decision to eliminate the ability of third parties to use its Chrome 
web browser to place cookie code on user devices. 
126. Appendix Sections B & C. 
127. Appendix Section H. 
128. Appendix Section I. 
129. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 742, 783 (2016). 
130. Appendix Section G. 
131. Appendix Section F. 
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While the Appendix reflects steps taken to comply with the CCPA, it is not 
tailored to companies which are subject to the GDPR.  Policies for such com-
panies would have, inter alia, GDPR specific disclosures about data subject 
requests (including the right to complain to a regulatory authority),132 disclo-
sures of the legal basis for the processing of the personal information, and 
mechanisms for providing opt-in consent to indicate their agreement. 
X.  CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL AND RESPONSIVE TO 
COVID-19 DEVELOPMENTS  
Any evaluation of an existing or proposed legal regimen must address four 
questions: 
• What harm is to be ameliorated by virtue of such intervention? 
• Can and will private markets do the job more efficiently? 
• Is the solution being evaluated actually contributing to improve-
ment?  
• What governmental unit(s) are best suited to implement regulation 
which is otherwise called for? 
Based upon the gravity of several of the measures which have been pro-
posed to deal with COVID-19, the authors believe that separating the discus-
sion of such measures from discussion of existing law is the best way to evalu-
ate both. 
A.  Breach Notification Statutes 
The easiest analysis is with respect to laws requiring breach notification.  
There is a clear need to take steps to reduce financial fraud resulting from data 
breaches.  One way to do so is to introduce penalties for companies which do 
not assist consumers in this regard, while the other is to provide consumers the 
information needed to assist themselves.  The numerous data breaches occur-
ring in recent years133 bespeak the actual—not potential—consumer exposure.  
Criminals would not engage in this activity if it were not beneficial to them.  
While some companies would take appropriate steps when being apprised of a 
problem, the delayed issuance of public notices that is all too prevalent indi-
cates that this is not necessarily the case. 
 
132. GDPR, supra note 3, at article 13. 
133. Green et al., If you bought anything from these 19 companies recently, your data may have 
been stolen, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/data-breaches-re-
tailers-consumer-companies-2019-1#macys-1 (indicating at least 19 consumer data breaches since 
January 2018).  Many more, such as Barnes & Noble, Chase, Yahoo, and Home Depot, just to name a 
few, occurred prior to such date. 
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Both anecdotal and empirical134 indicia reflect the actual inconvenience and 
harm to consumers.  While there is no way to determine what harm would have 
resulted if consumers were not advised of their exposure from breaches that did 
occur, or how many breaches did not occur because of security measures taken 
by companies seeking to avoid notice obligations, common sense indicates that 
the answer is far more than zero.  That is, the breach notices do result in reduc-
tion of consumer harm.  Absent notice of breaches, there is relatively little that 
impacted consumers can do to reduce their risk. 
The requirements which the authors have observed associated with these 
breach notification laws are also not overly burdensome.  For those not experi-
encing breaches, the obligation is largely that of development of an incident 
response plan, which, while not trivial by any means,135 is not horrendous.  In 
any event, for multi-national companies, such plans are dictated by Art. 32 of 
the GDPR, so the incremental burden associated with US law is very low. 
Even when a breach does occur, the required steps, such as written notice 
and offering of credit monitoring services, have become mainstream and, while 
usually costly, are not a major operational disruption. 
The above analysis militates strongly in favor of such regulation, but the 
patchwork of state laws is a problem.  The potential harm to a consumer from 
a data breach is the same whether the consumer resides in France, California, 
or North Carolina, so there is no reason for varying state standards.  There is a 
burden to business associated with having to track varying ‘triggers,’ notice 
time frames, and nuances in notice forms and procedures.  This is not a situation 
where the use of states as an innovation laboratory serves any purpose, and the 
irony is that each state’s zeal to legislate in this area has contributed to the ex-
ercise that undermines the very protections the statutes seek to afford.136  The 
patchwork approach benefits no one, but instead makes it harder for affected 
businesses to get necessary information to individuals on a timely basis.  A 
uniform federal standard is sorely needed. 
 
134. Dan Swinhoe, The 15 biggest data breaches of the 21st century, IDG COMMC’NS, INC., 
(April 17, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-
century.html. 
135. Robins et al., Privacy and Information Security – Cyber Incident Response Planning, 
FISHERBROYLES LLP, (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=71150f7e-
2525-49ca-bccd-431445aca06c. 
136. One of the authors, who advised a client on an actual data breach response several years 
ago when the statutory framework was less complex, observes that the research to determine the vari-
ous requirements in each state where there was an affected individual took a substantial amount of 
time which delayed the actual notification process, which could have been better spent by the impacted 
individuals in self-help efforts to investigate and mitigate harm. 
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B.  State Substantive Regulation 
While there is a very strong case to be made for breach notice laws, the 
same cannot be said for the efforts of states (and even the FTC) to prescribe 
technology and practices intended to secure information.  The fundamental 
problems with such steps are that (i) they may cause the entrenchment of obso-
lete approaches and technology, and (ii) the approaches of the various states 
may be inconsistent with each other and/or the FTC.  With technology changing 
so rapidly, literally several times per year in many relevant cases, what seems 
to be state of the art practice today may prove to be undesirable in short order.  
Fixing technical requirements by reference to a particular point in time (such 
as requiring encryption at a given number of ‘bits’) will seriously exacerbate 
the problem.  In any event, it is difficult to understand how legislators—at any 
level—can grasp the nuances of different approaches.  Even if they could do 
so, it is inevitable that issues will be seen differently by different people, which 
may lead to inconsistency.  Perhaps worse yet is the possibility that protocols 
endorsed or required by such laws will become targets for criminals. 
While the risk of inconsistency militates in favor of such regulation being 
implemented at the federal level, if it is to be done at all, the authors do not 
recommend that it be done at all.  The FTC’s effort to hold a company liable 
for use of N-1 generation wireless technology in the TJX case137 is a good ex-
ample.  Surely, in 2020 and beyond, we do not want there to be any inference 
that any technology which was suitable in 2006, 2008 or even 2018 is currently 
suitable.  It is far better to hold companies accountable for results, as opposed 
to prescribing specific technological steps to be taken. 
C.  Informal FTC Regulation 
The informal FTC regulation is quite interesting.  On the one hand, the FTC 
has usually taken a sophisticated, nuanced approach and developed insightful 
guidance for business.  While any particular pronouncement can be the subject 
of debate, most knowledgeable observers would agree that on balance, the FTC 
is performing a real service to the public and the business community with its 
real world-based suggestions for problem avoidance.  This is why the authors 
emphasize such guidance in day-to-day counseling activity.  The ongoing pleth-
ora of data breaches suggests that marketplace competition will not mitigate the 
problem.  Consumers for the most part do not have the expertise to distinguish 
among responsible and irresponsible vendors, and they have no visibility138 or 
 
137. The TJX Companies, Inc., FTC Matter/File No.  072-3055, (March 27, 2008). 
138. GDPR addresses this issue of visibility and requires that processors disclose and obtain 
from the controller authorization for all third parties who process the data of the controller downstream.  
GDPR, supra note 3, at article 28.  The proposed California ballot initiative entitled Consumer Privacy 
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control into the third party providers that support the vendors with whom they 
interact, such third party providers having an equally important role in privacy 
and data security. 
On the other hand, the characterization of such guidance as merely informal 
is problematic in light of the absence of precedential value of the consent de-
crees and Orders beyond the stated parties.  There is also a question of sanctions 
applicable to other parties who fail to take their cue from the directives.  If the 
FTC’s direction is in the public interest, it should be actual law.  If it is merely 
‘helpful guidance’ but not mandatory, this should be made clear.  It is hard to 
see how anyone benefits from this level of uncertainty.  A businessperson can 
quite reasonably ask in response to the invocation of the FTC’s guidance, ‘is 
this the law or isn’t it?’  Especially where conformance to the FTC’s direction 
will involve a substantial financial and operational burden, which is often the 
case for smaller and medium sized clients in industries not customarily thought 
of as data intensive, this determination is a key part of job performance for those 
responsible for legal compliance.  Government by press release and pamphlet 
is not government at all. 
While the only court to take up the matter has affirmed the FTC’s authority 
to act in this manner,139 the promulgation of so many specific directions pursu-
ant to a general 1914-era statutory prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices gives pause to most observers140 and allows questions as to the eventual 
position of other courts, ultimately including the US Supreme Court.  Not sur-
prisingly, the current FTC Chairman, Joseph Simons, has strongly advocated 
for some sort of codification.141 
As is the case with breach notification, it is time for Congress to speak ei-
ther through formal endorsement of these positions or a codification of specific 
topics and rejection of others. 
D.  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
As to COPPA, there is little dispute as to the need for oversight of the track-
ing of activity of children, who are inherently unable to properly oversee their 
 
Rights Act seeks to amend the CCPA by requiring service providers and contractors (a new definition) 
to provide notice of the use of other persons used to process personal data of the business.  California 
Public Records Act of 2020, Sec. 14 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.140(ag)(2), 1798.140(j)(2) 
(West 2020)). 
139. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D. N.J. 2014).  
140. Robins, supra note 23 (discussing the opinion of Former Homeland Security Secretary 
Chertoff). 
141. Eric J. Savitz, The Chairman of the FTC Says We Need a Federal Privacy Law, DOW 
JONES CO., (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/ces-ftc-chairman-privacy-law-
51578436640. 
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own affairs.  This is another situation where a national standard is in order as 
children’s exposure is the same regardless of geography.  COPPA is a good 
starting point for such standard, but only a starting point. 
While it is appropriate for the FTC to demonstrate that the statute is not a 
dead letter by going after those who blatantly disregard its existence,142 this will 
not suffice.  Among other needs is an amendment of the statute to remove some 
of the ambiguity created by terms such as ‘directed to children’ and substitute 
a new standard that may be tied, for example, to a given amount of actual usage 
by children,143 the site’s acceptance of advertising of particular types of prod-
ucts, or whether the site is operated by a vendor of products used primarily by 
children.  Another approach may be to regulate the transfer or other use of data 
by requiring some sort of certification in connection with the transfer as to the 
good faith lack of awareness, following reasonable inquiry, of the inclusion of 
such child-centric data in what is being transferred.  There is no foolproof way 
of excluding all children from sites which are the subject of tracking efforts, 
but requiring greater vigilance is definitely in order.  Clarifying legislation 
should incorporate several of the terms of the YouTube settlement144 and per-
haps the new UK law.145 
E.  Information Collection and Usage; Present law: Opt-in; Opt-out 
While measures to prevent or mitigate fraud and protect children are cer-
tainly in order notwithstanding the issue of from where they should emanate, 
the matter of ‘pure’ privacy regulation for adults which is not associated with 
fraud prevention is different.  One must ask ‘what harm is ultimately at issue 
with such regulation?’  Perhaps the better question is ‘what is meant by harm?’  
While there is much to be said for, and little to be said against, taking substantial 
steps to prevent and mitigate financial fraud, it is worth asking about the wis-
dom of the premise of the GDPR and CCPA that the simple collection and 
sharing of even ‘benign’ personal information like an IP address is in itself 
harmful.146  One can reasonably argue the philosophical merits of both posi-
tions, but in the authors’ view the absence of tangible, discernable harm dictates 
a rigorous consideration of the costs and benefits associated with more stringent 
regulation of commercial data collection and use. 
 
142. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 91 (noting that it (the FTC) has done so in the 
YouTube case). 
143. Although the mechanics of determining the age of a user are sometimes daunting. 
144. See Singer, supra note 92. 
145. U.S. Sen. Ed Markey, supra note 96. 
146. Such harm, to the extent it exists, can usually be mitigated through user action such as 
adjustment of device settings to enable private browsing mode, among other things, and express re-
quests to stop communications. 
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The common explanation/rationale for such regulation is the provision of 
people’s internet activity profiles to third parties without their consent, but this 
begs the question: what is the harm in that?  Such action often leads to serving 
of targeted advertising based upon a person’s web browsing history or physical 
location triggering promotional contact.  Such advertising may take the form of 
political advertising as was the case in the Cambridge Analytica situation.147  
However, no one is forced to respond to such advertising, whether by purchas-
ing the subject products, voting as desired, or otherwise.  Regardless of whether 
one likes it, it is virtually impossible to avoid being served often irrelevant ad-
vertising in public spaces.  At least the use of targeting techniques has the po-
tential benefit of making an effort to appeal to individual preferences and is a 
major component of the ‘free’ internet.  For that matter, no one is forced (or 
fraudulently induced) to join platforms such as Facebook.  As noted above, 
there is good reason for concern about children being deceived or enticed into 
dangerous situations, but by definition, adults are considered to be capable of 
properly exercising discretion. 
Simply put, deterring targeted advertising of any kind—commercial, polit-
ical or other—does not seem to implicate the individual freedom concerns that 
are so often cited as the basis for this type of regulation and which are discussed 
infra in the separate COVID-19 discussion section.  This is the case whether 
the advertising results from the use of cookies, geolocation tracking to facilitate 
serving of targeted advertising by businesses in the individual’s current vicin-
ity, or other devices.  None of this has anything to do with information provi-
sion to, or usage by, government.  If anything, a recent data breach indicates 
that Americans may be better protected by extension of the existing regulatory 
focus on securing the data used for such activity than by limiting its collection 
or use.148 
An example of the juxtaposition of these rationales is found in an unlikely 
place, namely an interview with Washington Post technology columnist Geof-
frey Fowler.149 
Mr. Fowler “dissects the privacy policies and practices of some of the 
world’s biggest, most powerful and most influential companies, and challenges 
 
147. Alex Hern, Cambridge Analytica: how did it turn clicks into votes?, THE GUARDIAN, (May 
6, 2018 03.00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/06/cambridge-analytica-how-
turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie. 
148. Zack Whittaker, Oracle’s BlueKai tracks you across the web. That data spilled online, 
TECHCRUNCH, (June 19, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/oracle-bluekai-web-tracking/. 
149. Jacob Sweet, Your Tech Relationship Counselor: Geoffrey Fowler tackles the “great reck-
oning” with privacy,  
HARV. MAG., January–February 2020,  https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2020/01/geoffrey-fowler-
tech. 
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them to do better. . . . [H]e uses brand new credit cards from Amazon and Apple 
to buy a single banana from Target then tracks how the two industry giants 
broadcast his data to a host of private companies.”150 
Again, so what harm has been done?  Nothing forces Mr. Fowler to do 
business with any of the recipients.  Some might consider this sort of sharing 
and follow-up to be ‘creepy,’ an adjective that surprisingly has been used some-
what as a term of art in the industry, but that begs the question of whether they 
cause any actual harm, and if so, what kind and to what extent. 
In the same article and on the same page, Mr. Fowler exhibits the same 
confusion as so many observers and commentators when he ‘sees potential dan-
ger when governments have more tools to harness data’151 and refers to the ef-
forts of Hong Kong protestors to shield their identities.  The concern with gov-
ernmental surveillance is a legitimate one and has taken on greater significance 
as society grapples with the best way to manage and mitigate COVID-19152, but 
there is no effort to make a connection between sharing by commercial parties 
and such surveillance.  A reference in the concluding paragraph to “surveillance 
capitalism” further muddles the issue. 
From recent experience with CCPA and GDPR client compliance efforts, 
the authors can say that there is a good deal of burden and expense associated 
with such process.  Among other things, this includes redrafting of privacy pol-
icies, working with web hosts and designers to incorporate election boxes, data 
mapping and cookie banner inclusion, providing for retention of records of such 
information for use in connection with investigations or litigation, working with 
staff to handle data subject requests and putting in place with third party ven-
dors appropriate (and generally highly negotiated, often by outside counsel) 
covenants,153 warranties and indemnities, and procurement of dedicated insur-
ance coverage.  What is not always apparent is that virtually any web presence 




152. Revelations regarding use by the US Internal Revenue Service of GPS tracking data to 
pursue those suspected of criminal tax violations only enhances such concerns and adds credence to 
those of Mr. Snowden.  Byron Tau, IRS Used Cellphone Location Data to Try to Find Suspects, WALL 





153. For GDPR and CCPA, the detailed prescriptions around such requirements necessitate 
amendment of contracts even where the existing language provides for the substance of the require-
ments.  GDPR, supra note 3, at article 28; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(w)(2)(A) (West 2020). 
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hosting providers, even where no one is making any surreptitious effort to sell 
anything to or otherwise influence data subjects. 
It is difficult to accept the need for burdensome legislation simply to ‘pro-
tect’ people against sales or persuasion efforts which are presented in many 
other contexts which are not mitigated through such legislation.  Very simply, 
in a capitalist, democratic society, the premise is that adults can and should 
make their decisions as to purchases or votes without government prompting.  
If there is a case to be made for legislation to avoid government surveillance, it 
should be made directly and not through the use of a red herring involving com-
mercial solicitations. 
Even Edward Snowden questions the value of the GDPR (and presumably 
would question the value of the CCPA) in responding to the privacy and sur-
veillance concerns that prompted him to speak out.154  While his concern is 
admittedly with the insufficiency of the sanctions, he openly questions whether 
the ultimate issue is collection of the sensitive data in the first place, as opposed 
to endorsing doing so pursuant to supposedly express consent.  Whatever Mr. 
Snowden may think, the authors have difficulty seeing the privacy benefit as-
sociated with the elaborate mechanical steps dictated by the GDPR and CCPA.  
Imposition on private companies of these requirements for mechanical steps 
does nothing to prevent or regulate government surveillance which, as dis-
cussed infra in the context of COVID-19 response measures, is of much greater 
significance now than was the case when the CCPA and GDPR were enacted. 
Making such laws even more problematic is their imposition in patchwork 
fashion.  The considerations are the same regardless of data subject location, 
and the various requirements simply complicate compliance efforts.  If require-
ments are in order at all within the US, they should be created at the federal 
level. 
XI.  COVID-19 AND PRIVACY  
The preceding discussion of existing authority hopefully prompts consider-
ation of several major topics associated with the role and scope of existing pri-
vacy law and related technology in American law and society.  However, 
COVID-19 and various measures, which are contemplated to deal with and pre-
vent its spread, implicate these and other considerations in a different and quite 
impactful manner and warrant separate discussion.  Everyone within and out-
side the public health area agrees that early detection and contact tracing of 
those who are infected or are likely to become infected are—perhaps the 
 
154. Steve Ranger, GDPR is missing the point, says Edward Snowden, ZDNET, (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-is-missing-the-point-says-edward-snowden/. 
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most—important tools in the effort to combat the virus, at least until develop-
ment of an effective vaccine and perhaps even thereafter. 
A.  Alternative Technologies 
The technology to carry out such detection and tracing exists and, while 
continuously being refined, the US has deployed such technology at a surpris-
ingly slow pace.155  Among other things, it uses location tracking technology, 
the limited usage for this purpose by governments leveraging data generated by 
private firms is discussed,156 and sometimes Bluetooth key overlap analysis,157 
and possibly other aspects of someone’s electronic footprint such as payment 
card transactions, to determine whether a person has come into potentially 
close–contact with someone who has tested positive for the virus, as well as 
whether someone who has the virus has been spreading it.  Such technology is 
integrated into smartphone apps presently available for download, and attor-
neys general across the US have raised concerns that the apps are proliferating 
without adequate restrictions to protect individuals’ privacy.158 
B.  Voluntary vs Mandatory: Legal and Health Ramifications 
Present and potential revision in US privacy law becomes relevant with re-
spect to whether persons simply may or must download the app and what is 
done with the information which it generates.  Many people, presumably in-
cluding most of those at high–risk of complications from the virus, will eagerly 
procure the app and utilize its information for early detection so that they may 
have as much warning as possible of potential infection and take preventative 
 
155. Associated Press, Contact tracing apps are off to a slow start in the U.S., NBC News, 






156. Complaint, American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. Clearview AI, Inc., Ill. Cir. Ct. (2020) 
(No. 9337839).  Whatever the exigency of the situation may dictate, current usage seems to fly in the 
face of at least the FCC’s insistence on a user opt-in. 
157. While there is still some doubt, as a technical matter, it appears that the use of the Blue-
tooth overlap approach is more conducive to preservation of privacy than the GPS-based approach, 
Farr, infra note 161. 
158. Attorneys General Ask Apple and Google to Ensure All Contact Tracing Apps Serve a 
Public Health Purpose, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.naag.org/naag/media/naag-news/attorneys-general-ask-apple-and-google-to-ensure-all-
contact-tracing-apps-serve-a-public-health-purpose.php.  On June 16, 2020, the National Association 
of Attorneys General sent a letter to the chief executive officers of Google and Apple requesting them 
to require that all contact tracing and exposure notification apps be affiliated with a public health au-
thority and removed from their respective marketplaces once the COVID-19 health crisis has ended. 
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measures.  There is little reason for legal concern at this point if use of the app 
is strictly voluntary and the information regarding the contact with an infected 
person goes no further. 
However, major privacy law and policy issues arise if (i) use of the tech-
nology is mandatory,  (ii) information regarding a user’s status, activities or 
whereabouts is shared with public health or law enforcement authorities, or (iii) 
any sort of action—such as home or other quarantine or activity restriction—is 
required of anyone in the process based upon information derived from the app.  
It cannot be denied that mandatory use is likely to be helpful to at least some 
extent in stopping virus spread, but making it mandatory substantially changes 
the privacy and civil liberties analysis.  However, so long as use is voluntary, 
there is only so much value to public health authorities, who have a genuine 
need to fully understand and act upon virus status and spread.159  The reference 
to ‘practically useless’ in the previously footnoted article makes the point. 
To date, app use is purely voluntary in the US, and technology providers 
such as Apple and Google are resisting such sharing despite requests from state 
health authorities.   
But as the tech giants have revealed more details, officials now say the 
software will be of little use.  Due to strict rules imposed by the com-
panies, the system will notify smartphone users if they’ve potentially 
come into contact with an infected person, but it won’t share any data 
with health officials or reveal where those meetings took place.160 
While not necessarily representing a majority viewpoint, many civil liber-
ties and privacy observers argue that a voluntary approach is essential.  An ob-
server from the Electronic Frontier Foundation explains:  “‘Having consent and 
good processes to grant and withdraw consent is critical,’ said Bennett Cyphers, 
a staff technologist at EFF by phone.”161  An article on a popular business site 
is aptly titled: The Covid-19 response must balance civil liberties and public 
health—experts explain how.162  
 
159. Reed Albergotti & Drew Harwell, Apple and Google are building a virus-tracking system. 
Health Officials say it will be practically useless, WASH. POST, (May 15, 2020), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/15/app-apple-google-virus/. 
160. Id.  However, apparently countervailing concerns of state Attorneys General discussed 
supra.  No response to such letter had been provided prior to this article going to press.  
161. As a practical matter, users who do not consent can simply not have a smartphone at all or 
turn off their phones or their location services functions (or not carry them at all) to frustrate the system.  
162. Christina Farr, The COVID-19 response must balance civil liberties and public health—
experts explain how, CNBC, (Apr. 18, 2020), https://nam02.safelinks.protection.out-
look.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnbc.com%2F2020%2F04%2F18%2Fcovid-19-response-
vs-civil-liberties-striking-the-right-
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The recent adoption by New York and New Jersey of a voluntary Blue-
tooth-based app which is seen as less intrusive than any GPS-tracking-based 
app, may expedite adoption of technology based mitigation efforts.163  The 
Bluetooth app simply indicates when someone using it has been within six feet 
of someone else who is using it and has tested positive. It does not create a 
record of where someone has been.  
Once there is some mandatory element to use such apps or the information 
they provide, a number of social policy considerations must be taken into ac-
count.  For example, if such measures can be used to provide public authorities 
with information about someone’s activities and locations, it allows deduction 
of their political, social, and perhaps their sexual preferences in a manner which 
may chill activity and expression. 
More fundamentally, if a person can be forced into quarantine because of 
data generated from such technology, this will impact many aspects of their life 
and livelihood.  In the most sophisticated technology-based tracking program 
in use, that of Washington State, the contact tracers, who are in large part Na-
tional Guard members, nominally do not have any formal authority to force 
anyone to do anything. 
However, Washington’s Governor, Jay Inslee did not rule out such a man-
datory approach, saying merely that he hoped it would not be necessary. 
Inslee said guardsmen serving as contact tracers will not have any law-
enforcement powers.  Asked what would happen to people who refuse 
to get tested or go into isolation, he said the state was getting a high 
percentage of compliance with current requirements.  “It just shouldn’t 
come to that,” he said.164 
There is little doubt that a mandatory approach is seen by knowledgeable 






163. Will Feuer & Kif Leswing, New York launches coronavirus contact tracing app as cases 
rise in hot spots, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/01/new-york-launches-coro-
navirus-contact-tracing-app-as-cases-rise-in-hot-spots.html. 
164. Jim Camden & Arielle Dreher, Washington Ready to Launch Contact Tracing Program, 
Gov. Says, GOV’T TECH., (May 13, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/health/Washington-Ready-to-
Launch-Contact-Tracing-Program-Gov-Says.html. 
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University of Washington School of Law associate professor Ryan 
Calo, argues that we can go too far in preserving privacy above all other 
factors. 
 
Calo looks at Google and Apple’s Bluetooth approach and sees other 
problems.  Because it’s voluntary, that might provide people with a 
false sense of security if they don’t get an alert.  Those who have opted 
out might be walking around with Covid-19 and infecting others with-
out ever being picked up with the system . . . 
  
In Calo’s view, contact tracing could be more effective if it wasn’t vol-
untary, and closely linked with public health reporting.165 
C.  Non-US Mandatory Approach 
European public health authorities, operating under the GDPR, agree with 
the desirability of widespread adoption, but struggle with the strong bias of the 
GDPR against it. “Experts estimate that 60% of a country’s population would 
need to use the app for it to be effective in preventing a second wave of infec-
tions.”166   
Support for the efficacy of such a mandatory approach can be found in the 
experience of Taiwan, which by most accounts did an excellent job of combat-
ting the virus and keeping its consequences to a minimum.  A fundamental—
but far from the only—element of the Taiwanese strategy was the curtailment 
of privacy for the duration of the threat in the opposite manner of that contem-
plated by pending US legislation. 
Despite its democratic credentials and open political culture, Taiwan 
unflinchingly curtailed privacy and individual liberty in the service of 
protecting public health during the COVID-19 epidemic.  Individuals 
under isolation or quarantine orders—either because they returned from 
abroad or because they had contact with an infected person—had their 
 
165. Farr, supra note 161. 
166. Bojan Pancevski & Sam Schechner, Coronavirus Contact—Tracing Apps Launch Across 






cle_email_share (distinguishing between Bluetooth and GPS-based approaches in a privacy context). 
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cell phones tracked and were immediately accosted by police if they 
left their homes or turned off their phones.167 
D.  Need for Unified Approach 
To the extent that such mandatory approach is seen as a legitimate device 
for combating the virus, the authors favor a robust national debate balancing 
the detriment associated with abridgement of liberty with the undeniable bene-
fit associated with reduction of serious disease.  One can reasonably view the 
situation from several perspectives, but it is curious to have actual legislation 
such as the CCPA restricting collection and commercial use of information de-
rived in this manner, at the same time that there is a good deal of interest in its 
deployment in situations where the consequences of its use are likely to be so 
much greater and subject to no such constraints.  Mr. Snowden’s concerns re-
garding use of personal information against citizens by military and law en-
forcement have extra meaning in this context. 
Federal legislation introduced by two Democratic Senators and one Repub-
lican Senator to regulate such usage is currently pending.168  For example, a 
Senate bill sponsored by Sens. Cantwell, Cassidy, and Klobuchar would require 
the same sort of opt-in.169 The authors believe that some sort of federal170 leg-
islation of this nature is in order.  In the meantime, the effort of New York 
authorities to subpoena contact information from attendees at a party, which 
 
167. Steven Weber & Nils Gilman, The Long Shadow of the Future, NOEMA, (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.noemamag.com/the-long-shadow-of-the-future/. 
168. Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. (2020). 
169. Tony Room, Members of congress to unveil bipartisan to regulate contact-tracing apps, 
fearing potential privacy abuses, WASH. POST, (June 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/tech-
nology/2020/06/01/contact-tracing-congress-privacy/; See also Krouse, supra note 2.  Interestingly, 
this bill addresses both potential civil liberties concerns and concerns with commercial use of infor-
mation gleaned from such app.  A similar bill has been introduced by Senate Republicans. Alysa Zelt-
zer Hutnik & Lauren Myers, Senate Republicans Release COVID-19 Privacy Bill, KELLEY DRYE, 
(May 7, 2020), https://www.adlawaccess.com/2020/05/articles/senate-covid-19-privacy-bill/.  The bi-
partisan bill “makes participation in commercial online exposure notification systems voluntary and 
gives consumers strong controls over their personal data, limits the types of data that can be collected 
and how it can be used, and contains strong enforcement provisions.”  Cantwell, Cassidy, and 
Klobuchar Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect Consumer Privacy Promote Public Health for 




170. As opposed to state legislation, with respect to which conflicting and differing obligations, 
and likely tied to different technologies, would likely make unwieldly even the most well-conceived 
program.   
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apparently contributed to the spread of COVID-19, indicates the likely direc-
tion of a mandatory approach.171 
Reasonable minds can differ as to the manner and extent to which technol-
ogy should be used to combat COVID-19, and other equally serious maladies, 
and the acceptable tradeoffs between such efforts at disease control and indi-
vidual privacy and liberty.  Public health authorities would be derelict in their 
responsibilities if they did not seriously explore all options for disease contain-
ment.  However, the authors believe that in connection with such exploration, 
policy-makers must acknowledge that such tradeoffs are an important reality 
and take them into account when determining the balance which best serves 
society. 
XII.  CONCLUSION 
In a complex, technologically-based society, where harm can befall indi-
viduals in several ways if their sensitive information falls into the wrong hands, 
it is essential that there be meaningful regulation of the manner in which per-
sonal information is collected, stored, transmitted, and utilized.  However, the 
various considerations implicated by such efforts to avoid harm make it essen-
tial that discussion focus on the specific harms which are deemed to be of great-
est importance so that the proper, least burdensome remedial measures can be 
prescribed.  The medical, economic, and social consequences of COVID-19 
and governmental responses to it, which implicate many of the considerations 
discussed in this article, add a major new dimension to the analysis.  The au-
thors hope that this article will play a small role in helping policy-makers ad-




171. Peter Sullivan, New York county issues subpoenas to people refusing to talk to contact 
tracers, THE HILL, (June 1, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/505437-new-york-county-is-
sues-subpoenas-to-people-refusing-to-talk-to-contact. 
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APPENDIX 
PRIVACY POLICY EXCERPTS172 
(OUTLINE LETTERING ADDED BY AUTHORS) 
 
XYZ Shirt Warehouse, Inc.  (“XYZ”) collects customer information to fa-
cilitate and enhance your shopping experience.  This privacy policy (“Policy”) 
is intended to assist you in understanding what information we gather about 
you when you visit one of our stores or our websites, how we use and share that 
information, and the safeguards we have in place for that information.  This 
Policy applies to the information collected at any of our stores, on the phone, 
and through our websites that link to this Policy.  References to XYZ.com shall 
refer generally to all of XYZ’s online services, including mobile applications.  
In this Policy, “we” and “our” mean XYZ, and “you” means any person who 
visits our website, uses our mobile application, or visits our U.S. stores. 
A.  Information We Collect and How We Use It 
“Personal information” means information that identifies, relates to, or de-
scribes, directly or indirectly, a particular individual, such as: name, address, 
email address, or phone number. 
We collect the following categories of personal information through 
XYZ.com, our stores, customer service and otherwise, and use it for typical 
business management, operational and commercial purposes (including to de-
fend and protect us and others from harm or legal claims, and as required by 
applicable law) and as described more specifically below: 
• Personal identifiers.  We receive personal identifiers (such as your 
name, phone number, email address, billing address, shipping 
address, password, device ids, and IP address), personal identifiers 
of others (such as an order recipient’s name and address) and use 
them to respond to requests, fulfill and deliver orders for 
merchandise and services, process returns or exchanges, contact 
you or others about an order or delivery, facilitate surveys, 
promotions, sweepstakes, and contests, manage accounts and 
preferences, facilitate rewards programs and accounts and to 
communicate with you for marketing and informational purposes.  
 
172. Included in a policy circulated via email to customers and posted January 8, 2020.  The 
company circulating such policy in response to the CCPA effectiveness has both physical store and 
online e-capability.  This example was chosen because it reflects consideration of most of the issues 
discussed in the text with respect to the CCPA, with the notable exception of the household concept. 
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We will also create a client number when you make a purchase and 
a XYZ VIP Rewards Number when you sign up to be a member so 
we can identify you.  We may also receive your driver’s license 
number when you make product returns, which we use for fraud 
prevention and to meet legal obligations. 
• Message and product review content.  We collect the messages you 
submit through contact, sign-up, surveys, purchase and product 
review forms on XYZ.com, such as customer service requests, 
messages to delivery recipients and delivery instructions.  We use 
this information to respond to and fulfill your requests, better 
understand your needs and preferences, enhance and personalize 
our product offerings to you and improve XYZ.com and our service 
and merchandise offerings. 
• Audio and visual information.  We receive any digital photos you 
submit through XYZ.com and post this information to public areas 
of XYZ.com at your direction.  To help protect you and others, we 
monitor and record video and take photographs of the public areas 
of stores for security, fraud, loss prevention, incident reporting and 
other operational purposes.  We may record customer service 
telephone calls for quality purposes and to meet our legal 
obligations. 
• Financial information.  We receive financial information (such as 
payment card and bank account information) to process payments 
for merchandise and services you purchase on XYZ.com. 
• Commercial transaction information.  We collect and generate 
commercial transaction information (such as records of 
merchandise and services purchased) when you make purchases on 
XYZ.com and in stores and when you make purchases using the 
XYZ-branded payment card.  We use this information to deliver 
and fulfill your orders, process your returns or exchanges, improve 
our service and merchandise offerings, tailor our marketing efforts 
and administer accounts, and for internal operations and reporting 
purposes. 
• Personal characteristics.  We receive personal characteristics (such 
as your birth date and birth dates of others, footwear size 
information, and locale) when you provide the information to us.  
We use the birth date information to personalize offers and gifts.  
We use footwear size information to provide you with the products 
you order and save your preferences.  We collect location when you 
submit reviews, so we can personalize the reviews for others. 
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B.   
• Geo-Location Information.  We collect mobile device identifiers 
and geo-location information of visitors’ devices in and around our 
stores to monitor foot traffic to help us understand how shoppers 
move around our stores, identify what shoppers seem interested in 
and improve the shopping experience. 
• Inferences from the information listed above.  XYZ will use the 
information listed above to draw inferences about your preferences 
(such as your preferred brands and styles) to help us provide you 
with personalized content and offers and help us develop and 
provide better merchandise and services. 
C.   
In addition, we and our third-party partners, such as advertising networks, 
social media widgets, and analytics providers, may automatically collect other 
categories of personal information using cookies and similar technology when 
you use XYZ.com, our emails, and in-store wi-fi services available near or in 
our stores.  We use this information to provide and improve our website and 
order processing, for anti-fraud purposes, to tailor your experience on 
XYZ.com and our marketing efforts, to provide our in-store wi-fi services and 
to create aggregate internal reports on website usage and activity, such as views 
of certain merchandise.  These additional categories may consist of: 
• Online identifiers.  XYZ may collect your IP address and other 
device and online identifiers when you use XYZ.com. 
• Geo-Location Information.  Many mobile devices permit 
applications to access real-time geo-location information.  We also 
may collect and use such information, with your consent.  In 
addition, some of the information we collect, such as IP addresses, 
may be used to estimate an approximate location of the device you 
are using to access XYZ.com.  We use location information to 
enhance and personalize the features and functionality of XYZ.com 
and merchandise and service offerings. 
• Website activity information.  XYZ may monitor and collect XYZ 
website activity information and device information, such as 
website clicks, content and page views, the website each visitor 
visited prior to our website, domain type, browser version, and 
internet service provider. 
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• Inferences from the information listed above.  XYZ will use the 
information listed above to draw inferences about your shopping 
preferences (such as your preferred brands and styles) to help us 
provide you with personalized content and offers and help us 
develop and provide better merchandise and services. 
XYZ collects various types of personal information from and about Cali-
fornia residents both online (at XYZ.com) and offline during the course of our 
customer relationship. 
D.  Sharing for Others’ Marketing Purposes.   
Under California law, if you are a resident of California, you may make a 
written request to XYZ to request how we have shared your information with 
third parties for their direct marketing purposes.  In response to your written 
request, XYZ is allowed to provide you with a notice describing the cost-free 
means to opt-out of our sharing your information with third parties with whom 
we do not share the same brand name, if the third party will use it for their direct 
marketing purposes. 
XYZ has chosen to provide you with a cost-free means to opt-out of such 
sharing.  If you would like to instruct us to no longer share your personal infor-
mation with third parties who will use it for direct marketing purposes, please 




If you have any questions about this opt-out procedure, please write to 
the address provided above. 
E.  Online Tracking.   
XYZ may permit third parties to track the individual visitors to its website 
and the activities of those visitors on XYZ.com over time, and they may track 
those visitors across other websites and online services, if those websites and 
apps also use the same partners (as described above in the “Cookies, Pixel Tags, 
and Similar Technology” section).  Currently, XYZ does not offer the option 
for its website visitors to make a “Do Not Track” election and does not have 
the capability to respond to electronic “Do Not Track” signals.  XYZ reserves 
the right to add such capability to its website at any time in the future and will 
notify website visitors of this change in capability through an update to this 
Policy. 
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F.  Privacy Rights Requests.   
California consumers have the right to request: 
• the deletion of the personal information we have about them; 
• additional information about whether and how we have collected, 
used, disclosed and sold personal information about them; 
• the specific pieces of personal information we have about them; and 
• an opt-out of future sales of their personal information at 
xyz.com/opt-out. 
California consumers also have the right not to receive discriminatory treat-
ment if they exercise the rights list above. 
When you make a request, we may require that you provide information 
and follow procedures so that we can verify the request and your jurisdiction 
before responding to it.  The verification steps we take may differ depending 
on the request you make.  We will match the information that you provide in 
your request to information we already have on file to verify your identity.  If 
we are able to verify your request, we will process it.  If we cannot verify your 
request, we may ask you for additional information to help us verify your re-
quest. 
To make requests, California consumers may call us at 1-866-379-7463 or 
contact us through the web page located here.  Consumers will be required to 
submit their name, email address, and telephone number, and may also be asked 
to provide their address, XYZ VIP Rewards Number, and a recent order number 
so that we can verify the request.  Please provide as much of the requested 
information as possible to help us verify the request.  We will only use the 
information received in a request for the purposes of responding to the request. 
California law permits California consumers to use an authorized agent to 
make privacy rights requests.  We require the authorized agent to provide us 
with proof of the California consumer’s written permission (for example, a 
power of attorney) that shows the authorized agent has the authority to submit 
a request for the California consumer.  An authorized agency must follow the 
process described above to make a request, and we will additionally require the 
authorized agent to verify his/her own identity and we may confirm the agent’s 
authority with the California consumer about whom the request was made. 
G. 
We do not sell personal information for money; however, in the prior 12 
months, we have permitted third parties (online analytics and advertising 
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companies, affiliates, and co-brand partners) to use personal information for 
their business and commercial purposes that may not directly benefit XYZ 
(such as to provide and improve their products and services or for their or oth-
ers’ marketing purposes).  This sharing may be considered a “sale” of personal 
information under the California Consumer Privacy Act.  We shared (or “sold”) 
for these purposes the following categories of personal information: personal 
identifiers (including device identifiers), ratings and review content, commer-
cial transaction information, personal characteristics, XYZ.com browsing ac-
tivities, and inferences drawn from these categories.  We do not knowingly 
“sell” the personal information of individuals under the age of 16.  You may 
access our page to opt out of future “sales” [at this link].  If you opt out, we 
may ask you to consent to such “sales” in the future. 
H.   
We employ reasonable security measures to secure the information we re-
ceive.  For example, we take the following types of security measures: use of 
technologies and policies such as limited access data-centers, firewall technol-
ogy, and secure socket layer certificate authentication.  Any credit card/debit 
card information will be encrypted by the use of a “token” for security purposes. 
We designed xyz.com to accept orders only from Web browsers that accept 
cookies and permit communication through Secure Socket Layer (SSL) tech-
nology.  SSL is encryption technology that provides security while information 
is being transmitted over the Internet. 
While we implement the above security measures on this website, you 
should be aware that 100% security is not always possible. 
We encourage you to take steps to help protect the confidentiality and se-
curity of your xyz.com account and personal information by periodically re-
viewing your xyz.com account and immediately reporting any unexpected ac-
tivity or unrecognized information; installing the latest security updates and 
anti-virus software on your computer to help prevent malware and viruses; us-
ing complex and diverse passwords; keeping your password private; password 
protecting your computer and mobile device; and signing out of your xyz.com 
account before closing your internet browser. 
I.  Merger, sale, or other asset transfers.   
In the event of a merger, acquisition, financing due diligence, reorganiza-
tion, bankruptcy, receivership, sale of company assets, or transition of service 
to another business unit (whether by private sale, through operation of law, as 
part of a divestiture plan, or otherwise), we will provide any personal infor-
mation and transaction history associated with each such business unit to the 
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persons and/or entities assuming control of such business unit and our advisors 
or as otherwise necessary to complete the transaction as permitted by law or 
contract. 
 
